NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 2 | Issue 1

Article 8

1998

The Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act:
Information Sharing and Preemption
Joseph L. Seidel

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Joseph L. Seidel, The Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act: Information Sharing and Preemption, 2 N.C. Banking Inst. 79 (1998).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol2/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.

THE CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTING
REFORM ACT:
INFORMATION SHARING AND PREEMPTION
JOSEPH

L. SEIDELt

I. INTRODUCTION

The Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act, enacted
October 1, 1996, contains the most comprehensive reform of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) since its enactment in 1968.
Particularly, newly enacted amendments to the FCRA that became
effective October 1, 1997 contain provisions that modify
requirements regarding information sharing between affiliated
companies and that provide federal preemption of state laws in this
area. These new statutory FCRA provisions appear quite broad and
would seem on their face to override virtually all relevant state laws.
This result provides opportunities for financial companies to create
greater synergies among their affiliates by sharing customer
information and to take full advantage of technological
advancements in seamlessly offering financial products to their
customers, including banking, securities and insurance products. As
the financial marketplace develops into a national marketplace and
evolves even further beyond that to an "Intemet" marketplace, the
ability to share information among the different affiliates of a
company without restriction will be critical. The information sharing
provisions of the 1996 law are an important first step that will foster
the further development of a national consumer credit market with
efficiencies and convenience resulting for financial consumers.
In order to analyze the intent and breadth of these newly
enacted provisions, this Article traces their legislative history during
the lengthy consideration of the FCRA amendments from 1990 until
t Partner, Williams & Jensen, P.C., Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1980, Johns Hopkins
University; M.Sc., 1981, London School of Economics; J.D., 1985, American University.
Mr. Seidel is a former General Counsel of the House Committee on Banking & Financial
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their enactment in the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Bill in
1996.1 Then, the Article examines post-enactment developments,
Model Privacy legislation passed in several states, as well as
Uniform Privacy Guidelines promoted by the banking industry that
seek to strike a balance between the consumer benefits from sharing
customer information versus customer's privacy interests.
Based on a review of the legislative history of the new
affiliate FCRA information sharing and the preemption provisions,
support exists for an aggressive reading of the statute. The final
statutory language, on its face, appears to preempt all state laws.
Although parts of the early Congressional discussion related to
preemption are somewhat unfocused, the later legislative history,
beginning with the 103d Congress in 1993, distinctly states a
Congressional intent to preempt any state law that may conflict with
the federal standard concerning affiliate information sharing. Senate
Banking Committee Reports in 1993 and 1995, as well as the 1994
House Banking Committee Report, all appear to support the precept
that Congress intended a "national uniform standard" to occupy the
field so as to create "a single set of Federal rules [to] promote
operational efficiency for industry and competitive prices for
consumers."2 There was a strong belief by proponents that financial
consumers would be the ultimate beneficiary of a more efficient
marketplace that could be created through the unrestricted use of
customer information within a family of companies.
While the view supporting broad federal preemption of any
state law concerning affiliate information sharing by the FCRA has
been publicly supported by legal commentators3 and in public

1. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 stat. 3009.
2. S.REP. No. 104-185, at 55 (1995).
3. See Richard Fischer et al., Amended Credit Reporting Law Sets U.S. Norm, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 22, 1996 at 9.
[T]he revised law preempts all state and local laws (both as to
requirements and prohibitions) in a number of important areas for
banks. By preempting all such provisions, the amended statute
establishes itself as the national uniform standard ....It also preempts
any state or local law regarding the sharing of information among
affiliated companies, such as members of the same holding company
family, with the exception of one narrow Vermont law.
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comments,4 practitioners have been generally taking a cautious view
toward applying the new statute. Although the issue has not been
litigated to date, it may come up in the near future related to the issue
of national bank insurance sales under the decision in Barnett Bank
of Marion County v. Nelson5 and also related to state information
sharing restrictions that have been enacted post-Barnett.
Specifically, national banks may be challenging state information
sharing restrictions in Rhode Island and Florida using the newly
enacted FCRA preemption provisions as a basis.
Part II of this Article briefly outlines the newly enacted
statutory provisions of the FCRA passed as part of the 1996
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act. Part III provides a
survey of the legislative history of the FCRA amendments related to
affiliate information sharing and preemption from the initial
introduction of FCRA legislation in 1990 until its enactment in 1996.
Part IV describes post-enactment developments related to the
implementation of the new FCRA standards. Part V reviews the
National Association of Insurance Commissioner's (NAIC)
Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Model Act in relation
to the FCRA's new affiliate information sharing and preemption
standards as well as in relation to the McCarran-Ferguson Act
(McCarran). Part VI outlines uniform privacy guidelines currently
proposed by a group of bank trade associations. Finally, Part VII
concludes by stating that the amendments to the FCRA will have a
major impact on the consumer credit market and are a key step in
fully utilizing today's technology to benefit financial consumers.
II. NEWLY ENACTED STATUTORY FCRA PROVISIONS
The new FCRA amendments entitled the Consumer Credit
Reporting Reform Act of 1996 were passed as subtitle D of the
Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996
(EGA) and were contained in the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act, which was enacted on the last day of the 104th
Congress. The FCRA provisions were part of a larger bank

4. See Visa/MasterCard Comment Letter, OCC Docket No. 97-01 (May 15, 1997).
5. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
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regulatory relief package designed to benefit the financial industry

(particularly commercial banks) as a tradeoff for administration
proposals to recapitalize the Savings Association Insurance Fund.

As background related to affiliate information sharing, prior
to the 1996 bill, there was an open question under the FCRA as to

whether information exchanged among affiliated companies was a
"credit report" and thereby limited as to its use under the Act. A
general concern existed within the financial industry that the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), as the primary interpreter of the Act,

would take a restrictive view toward this question. Therefore, in the
legislative consideration of FCRA reform, the issue of ensuring that

information shared among affiliates was not a credit report became a
top priority of the financial industry. As a result, section 2402(e) of
the EGA amended section 603(d) of the FCRA dealing with the
definition of "credit report."
Section 2402(e)(4) of the EGA
specifically lists items not considered credit reports. 6 Section

603(d)(2)(A) generally exempts shared information from the
statutory duties surrounding the use of a "credit report" in the event
that proper disclosures are made and the consumer has the ability to
"opt-out" of having the information shared.7 In addition, the new
section 603(d)(2)(A) of the FCRA provides an exclusion for
information shared among affiliates. Shared information could

6. The new section 603(d)(2) provides:
(2)EXCLUSIONS. - The term 'consumer report' does not include (A) any (i) report containing information solely as to transactions or experiences
between the consumer and the person making the report;
(ii) communication of that information among persons related by
common ownership or affiliated by corporate control; or
(iii) any communication of other information among persons related by
common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if it is clearly and
conspicuously disclosed to the consumer that the information may be
communicated among such persons and the consumer is given the
opportunity, before the time that the information is initially
communicated, to direct that such information not be communicated
among such persons ....
15 U.S.C.A. § 168la(d)(2) (West 1997).
7. As a practical matter, the opportunity for a consumer to "opt-out" of information
sharing under the new section 603(d)(2)(A)(iii) of the FCRA could be presented through an
additional disclosure and an acknowledgment under the general signature line of an
application.
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include experience, transactional, application and credit report
information.
Section 2411(e) of the EGA amends section 615(b) of the
FCRA by inserting a,new section 615(b)(2) entitled "Duties of
Person Taking Certain Actions Based on Information Provided By

Affiliate." 8 This provision generally requires a credit grantor to
provide an Equal Credit Opportunity Act type of adverse action
notice in cases where an action is taken based on shared information,
such as application information. The adverse action notice would not
be required if the adverse action was based on experience,
transactional or credit report information. In addition, notice would

be required, but the reinvestigation requirements of section 615 of
the FCRA would not apply.
Finally, section 2419 of the EGA amends the preemption

provisions contained in section 624 of the FCRA. The language of
8. The new paragraph states:
(2) DUTIES OF PERSON TAKING CERTAIN ACTIONS BASED
ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY AFFILIATE. (A) DUTIES, GENERALLY. - If a person takes an action described in
subparagraph (B) with respect to a consumer, based in whole or in part
on information described in subparagraph (C), the person shall (i) notify the consumer of the action, including a statement that the
consumer may obtain the information in accordance with clause (ii) and
(ii) upon a written request from the consumer received within 60 days
after the transmittal of the notice required by clause (i), disclose to the
consumer the nature of the information upon which the action is based
by not later than 30 days after receipt of the request.
(B) ACTION DESCRIBED. - An action referred to in subparagraph
(A) is an adverse action described in section 1681a(k)(1)(A), taken in
connection with a transaction initiated by the consumer, or any adverse
action described in clause (i) or (ii) of section 1681(k)(1)(B).
(C) INFORMATION DESCRIBED. - Information referred to in
subparagraph (A) (i) except as provided in clause (ii), is information that
(I) is furnished to the person taking the action by a person related by
common ownership or affiliated by common corporate control to the
person taking the action; and
(II) bears on the .credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity,
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living
of the consumer; and
(ii) does not include (I) information solely as to transactions or experiences between the
consumer and the person furnishing the information; or
(II) information in a consumer report.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1681m(b)(2).
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new section 624(d) 9 appears broad on its face and would seem to
override any state law "with respect to the exchange of information
among persons affiliated by common ownership or common
corporate control." In addition, the FCRA amendments appear to
indicate that preemption would continue past January 1, 2004, unless
a state after that date passes a new affiliate information sharing law
that expressly states an intent to supplement the federal FCRA and
provides greater consumer protection.
The combination of the amendments to the definition of a
"credit report" under section 603(d) along with the preemption
provision of new section 624(b) appear to give financial companies a
powerful new.- tool in providing services to their customers.
Practically speaking, information can now be shared among
companies within the same family so that the customer's needs can
be optimally served whether the customer needs a deposit product,
credit card, mortgage, mutual fund, annuity or other insurance
product. The information sharing provisions permit the company to
communicate the customer's needs to the full range of affiliated
companies, and the preemption provisions are designed to ensure a
uniform national marketplace that cannot be impeded by geographic
restrictions.

9. New section 624(b) states:
(b).. . No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws
of any State ....
(2) with respect to the exchange of information among persons

affiliated by common ownership or common corporate control, except
that this paragraph shall not apply with respect to subsection (a) or

(c)(1) of section 2480e of title 9, Vermont Statutes Annotated (as in
effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting

Reform Act of 1996) ....
Id. § 1681t(b).
The new section 624(d) goes on to state that the preemption provisions do not apply
to state laws (i) enacted after January 1, 2004; (ii) that state specifically that they are
designed to supplement the federal FCRA; and (iii) that "give greater protection to

consumers." Id. § 1681t(d).
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III. SURVEY OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

A.

Introduction

FCRA reform took four complete Congresses and close to
seven full years (March 1990 to October 1996) to enact. At times
FCRA reform was hotly contested and was the subject of some of the
closest floor votes in recent Congressional history. The affiliate
information sharing and preemption provisions evolved over this
time frame and by the end of the process were met with general
agreement. The final language of these provisions, after being
debated for almost seven years, was quite precise and represented
one of the big "wins" in the bill for the financial industry. At the
time there was wide-spread agreement that the effect of the
provisions was to create a uniform national standard so as to
engender a more efficient and responsive consumer credit market.
The legislative history below charts the long and sometimes tortuous
path taken to get to this welcome, final resting point.
B.

101st Congress (1989-1990)

FCRA Reform legislation (H.R. 4213-the Consumer Credit
Protection Amendments of 1990) was originally introduced in March
1990 during the 101st Congress by Representative Lehman (D-CA).
Representative Lehman was Chairman of the House Banking
Committee's Consumer Affairs & Coinage Subcommittee with
jurisdiction over consumer credit matters. The legislation as
introduced was generally opposed by financial industry groups and,
after a hearing in June 1990, no further action occurred on the bill.
The Lehman bill did not include either affiliate information sharing
or preemption provisions. Senator Cranston (D-CA) introduced
companion legislation in the Senate, but no action occurred on the
bill.
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102d Congress (1991-1992)
1. Summary

During the 102d Congress, FCRA legislation took a high
profile in the House and was filled with controversy as well as
procedural anomalies.
During this Congress, the affiliate
information sharing provisions were first introduced into the FCRA
debate. More importantly, protracted battles developed concerning
federal preemption. The floor vote of 203 to 207 against an
amendment offered by Banking Committee Chairman Gonzalez to
strike the preemption provision from the bill was one of the closest
votes of the entire Congress. The vote in favor of preemption
ultimately caused the House Democratic Leadership to suspend
consideration of the bill, effectively killing it for the Congress.
Companion legislation was introduced in the Senate, but no action
was taken.
2. Congressional Action
During the 102d Congress, FCRA reform legislation took a
twisted and contentious path. In October 1991, FCRA reform
legislation was re-introduced by new Consumer Affairs
Subcommittee Chairman Torres (D-CA). Hearings were held on the
bill, and ultimately a Subcommittee mark-up was scheduled for
March 1992. During the March 1992 Subcommittee mark-up,
amendments related to preemption and affiliate information sharing
were first introduced into the FCRA debate. The preemption
amendment was far different in scope than the language ultimately
enacted into law several years later. The initial amendment likely
was intended to preempt only state credit reporting laws or miniFCRAs. While it is unclear from some of the broad-based rhetoric,
there does not appear to be any discussion of the amendment's
impact on state laws that were unrelated to credit reporting. In fact,
provisions were added to "clarify" that the preemption amendment
did not extend to state unfair trade practice acts. Both the affiliate
information sharing and preemption amendments were met with
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strong opposition by the Democratic Leadership of the Committee,
and the issue of preemption engendered strong and emotional debate.
The preemption amendment was initially offered by Representatives
Barnard (D-GA) and Wylie (R-OH) and involved preemption of all
conflicting state FCRA laws. The explanation of the amendment
prepared by the Wylie staff expressly stated that "(t)his amendment
provides that the Fair Credit Reporting Act preempts conflicting state
fair credit reporting laws." This appears to be a limiting explanation
of the original preemption amendment, but is consistent with
Representative Wylie's position throughout the debate during the
102d Congress. The amendment prevailed at the subcommittee on a
nine to seven vote.
Separately, Representative Wylie then offered the affiliate
information sharing amendment as the last amendment of the markup.
Again, the amendment met with opposition from the
Subcommittee Chair and again the amendment prevailed by a ten to
six vote.'0 The bill was then sent to the full Banking Committee
where the preemption provisions became the source of considerable
controversy. Representative Gonzalez (D-TX), Chairman of the
House Banking Committee, indicated that his top priority was to
delete the preemption provision. At the full Committee mark-up
occurring on March 25, 1992, Chairman Gonzalez and
Subcommittee Chairman Torres engaged in fierce opposition" to the
preemption provisions,
Both Members read the preemption
provisions broadly.'
10. During the debate Representative Wylie, the amendment's sponsor, stated:
I think I can explain this amendment very quickly and easily by simply
reading it. What it does is provide that it is permissible for exchange of
information between subsidiaries of a holding company. It would

suggest that, if information is obtained in an application from a person
who wants credit, that information, as I say, can be exchanged within
the subsidiaries of the holding'company. It's an attempt to reduce cost,

and it cannot be done, though, unless the consumer's consent is given in
advance.'
Mark-up of HR 3596, Before the House Banking Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs &
Coinage, 102d Cong. 100 (Mar. 5, 1992).
11. Chairman Gonzalez stated: "[One] can put lipstick on a hog, but it is still a pig ...

[the preemption amendment] does preempt, the -p!ain reading of this will show, stronger
state fair credit laws." Id. at 39.
12. Representative Torres stated: "The'subject matter is quite expansive, and it includes
the collection, dissemination .'.. and the furnishing of any information-=any information
on consumers . ..so while [thp preemption] amendment does clarify the scope of the
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Supporters of preemption initially offered an amendment to
clarify the preemption language by providing that the section was not
intended to override state unfair or deceptive trade practice acts.
This attempt at clarification again implies an amendment that was
more limited in scope and tailored directly to overriding state credit
reporting statutes, while failing to impact other state laws.
Ultimately, this revised form of the preemption provision was
preserved, and Chairman Gonzalez's attempt to delete the provision
failed by a twenty-four to twenty-seven vote. Because of this failure,
Chairman Gonzalez subsequently suspended the Committee's
consideration of the bill and did not permit the Committee to report
the bill to the House floor.
The Banking Committee reconvened on June 18, 1992, to
approve the FCRA bill including the preemption amendments. At
that time, Chairman Gonzalez again indicated his opposition and
broadly described the preemption provisions. 3 The bill was then
sent to the House floor under a modified closed rule with the first
amendment being an amendment offered by Chairman Gonzalez to
strike the bill's preemption provisions. The amendment was
generally opposed by industry groups and supported by both
consumer groups and state attorney generals. After a contentious
floor fight on the issue, 4 the Gonzalez amendment failed by a 203 to
207 margin. Representative Gonzalez then moved that the House
"rise" and suspend further consideration of FCRA reform on the
House floor. This procedural development effectively ended
Congressional consideration of the issue during the 102d Congress.

provision, it does not narrow it." Id. at 47.
13. Chairman Gonzalez stated:
In its present form... the doors of the state legislatures in effect would

be padlocked to prevent consumers, that is our constituents, from
seeking additional protection at the state level. It is unbelievable that
this committee and the Congress have been called upon to provide a
special interest shield for the industry against state consumer protection
laws .. .no rational or substantive reason has been put forward to

justify taking the states out of the picture.
Mark-up of H.R. 3596, Before the House Banking Comm., 102d Cong, at 7-8 (June 18,

1992).
14. See 138 CoNG. REc. at H9376.
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3. Committee Reports

Pursuant to reporting H.R. 3596, the House Banking
Committee issued House Report Number 102-692, outlining the
Committee's views on the legislation. Like most elements of FCRA
legislation during the 102d Congress, the Committee Report sparked
a certain level of controversy. In particular, an unusual situation had
developed such that the Chairmen of the full Committee and the
relevant Subcommittee who were charged with preparing the report
had lost votes on the major substantive issues involved in the
legislation, including votes on preemption and information sharing.
This unusual situation led to the rather extraordinary development of
the Republican minority filing its own separate section-by-section
analysis. 5
Given this controversy, the Committee Report gives limited
additional guidance on the affiliate information sharing and
preemption provisions. The Committee Report does give guidance
in determining what is a consumer report.16 While this gives the
15. Representatives Wylie and McCandless of the Minority stated:
In view of that, and as the Ranking Republican of the Banking
Committee, and as the Ranking Republican of the Subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs who was a co-sponsor of the underlying text which is
now H.R. 3596, we felt constrained to call attention to the fact that not
all aspects of the 'Explanation of Legislation' in an earlier part of this
report accurately reflect the intended meaning of the statutory language.
In fact, we are concerned that some sections have been construed in a
manner which we believe to be outside of the purpose and intent of the
statutory language.
In some cases, the explanation is actually
inconsistent with provisions as drafted and approved .... The issue is
that those provisions and other interpretations are far beyond the
intention and consensus of the drafters of legislation, and are not
consistent with the actions of the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs
and the full Banking Committee.
H.R. REP. No. 102-692, at 51 (1992).
16. The House Report states:
The Bill excludes from the definition of 'consumer report' the
sharing of information on a consumer among related entities if the
information is comprised solely of transactions of experiences between
one of the entities and the consumer. The exclusion covers any
communication of such information among related organizations
whether the information is transferred directly between two related
organizations or is communicated through a third related organization.
This exclusion from the definition of the term 'consumer report' does
not broaden the type of information that is currently exempted from the
definition (i.e., transaction or experience with a consumer), but rather
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general direction of the Committee's intent, the provisions of the

Report on the disclosures required for affiliate information sharing,
specifically the "knowingly" requirement and the concept of a
separate disclosure, were disputed by the sponsors of the
amendment. 7
Related to preemption, the House Report offered a view that
the proposed new section would only preempt state FCRA laws
directly dealing with the subject of credit reporting. The language of
the Report appears to state an intent that only state credit reporting

laws, not any other state laws, including insurance privacy laws,
would be preempted.'
permits the sharing of that information in a broader range of corporate
settings without triggering the conditions governing the sharing of
consumer reports.
Additionally, the bill treats information from a credit application
as excluded, frorp 'the definition of 'consumer report' where that
information is shared among related entities and the consumer has
specifically and 'liowingty Onrsented to that sharing of information.
The. bill requires that the entity 'intending, to share such information
provide the consumer 'with 'a clear, and conspicuous disclosure
indicating that intent. This requirement will be satisfied where the entity
-provides a separate notice and consent form' with the application to be
signed by the consumer:
Current. interpretation :suggests that a report containing
information provided on a credit application may not fall within the
'tiansadtion' or 'experience' exclusion from the' definition" of consumer
report. -See United States V.Puntorieri, 379 F. Supp. 332 (ED.N.Y.
1074); 5 CCH Con, Cted. 'Guide ' 1,202'(197,1). Thus, under current
law an entity that shares appli6ation' information may be considered a
consumer reportinig agency.' It is the Committee's intent to permit the
sharing of application informatibn amofig related entities outside of the
structures surrounding the fumishing of a consumer report, but only
where those entities strictlyadhere to the specific conditions in the bill
after the effective-date of the bill. ...

Additiopally, the bill excludes from the' definition of 'consumer
report' information from a consumer report which is shared among
related entities for prescreening acivities where (1) the consumer whose
report is procured is given a separate, clear and conspicuous notice by
the person obtaining the report that the report could be provided to and
used by affiliated entities, and (2) the consumer consents in writing to
the sharing of the report.
H.R. REP. No. 102-692, at 21-23 (1992).
17. See id. at 49-50 (supplemental views of Representative Barnard); see also id at 51
(supplemental views of Mr. Wylie and Mr. McCandless).
18. The Report stated:
This section provides for the federal preemption of any state law that
relates to the subject matter of the FCRA. However, any state may
employ or establish state laws to enforce the provisions of the FCRA.
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4. Congressional Statements

Debate on H.R. 3596 was often confused and inconclusive.
There is little beyond Representative Wylie's initial statement related
to affiliate information sharing. Concerning the preemption issue
that became the focal point of the legislation, there appears to be at
least three theories on the scope of the provision. Representative
Barnard, as the primary sponsor of the amendment, believed that its
intent was to preempt all conflicting state laws. During debate
Representative Barnard often cited the preemption provision of the
Fair Charge and Credit Card Disclosure Act as being a model for
FCRA preemption.' Under the credit card legislation, the federal
legislation occupied the field related to disclosure, and
Representative Bamard produced two Congressional Research
Service Memorandums supporting this position.20 - Representative
Barnard's clear intent was a broad based preemption provision.2'
Likewise, Representatives Gonzalez and Torres, as major
opponents of preemption, offered a broad based view of the scope of
the provisions, presumably to dramatize their impact.
They
continually spoke in terms that implied that the preemption provision
overrode all state consumer-protection laws. Only Representative
Wylie appeared to state a different view In attempting to understate
the significance of the amendment, Representative Wylie stated,
Nothing in this section restricts the ability of any state to employ or
establish laws to address unfair or deceptive trade practices, or privacy
laws that do not relate to the subject matter of the FCRA. Furthermore,
states may employ or establish their own penalties to enforce violations
of the FCRA.
Id. at 74.
19. See Mark-up of H.R. 3596, Before the House Banking Consumer Affairs & Coinage
Subcomm., 102d Cong. 81 (1992).
20. See Memorandum from Cong. Resch. Serv. to the Honorable Doug Barnard Jr.
(Mar. 24, 1992); Memorandum from Cong. Resch Serv. to the Honorable Paul Kanjorski
(Sept. 24, 1992).
21. During the House Banking Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs & Coinage,
Representative Sanders stated: "But Mr. Barnard, then, what you have just told us - please
correct me if I am wrong - is that you have now wiped out all state laws -- " and Mr.
Barnard responded "That's true. I don't deny that." Mark-up of H.R. 3596, Before the
House Banking Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs & Coinage, 102d Cong., at 94 (1992). See
also Representative Darden's House Floor Statement on behalf of Representative Barnard,
"The Committee on Banking voted to make these (credit reporting law) protections and
duties uniform, and I urge my colleagues to uphold the committee's bipartisan judgment."
138 CONG. REc. at H9399 (daily ed. Sept.24, 1992).
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"[w]hat the amendment does is preempt conflicting-and I use the
word 'conflicting'
advisedly-state credit reporting laws."
Representative Wylie appeared to carry that view throughout the
considerable debate on the bill, and his view is reflected in the
Republican section-by-section analysis filed in the Committee
Report.
D.

103d Congress (1993-1994)
1. Summary

Congressional activity resumed on FCRA reform during the
103d Congress. The Senate took a far more active role, and
legislation was introduced and passed by Senators Bryan (D-NV) and
Bond (R-MO). The Senate provisions related to affiliate information
sharing and preemption ultimately converged with amendments
adopted in the House Banking Committee which led to final
compromises on these issues. The form of the federal preemption
provision changed from a format designed to override only state
credit reporting laws to a format designed to override any state law
related to certain operational areas. These operational areas included
adverse action notices, prescreening and most importantly, affiliate
information sharing. Despite widespread support for the legislative
package that ultimately emerged, final passage did not occur during
the 103d Congress due to isolated opposition in the Senate.
2. Congressional Action
During the 103d Congress, two parallel tracks for FCRA
legislation developed in the House and the Senate ultimately leading
to a compromise package that narrowly missed enactment due to last
minute opposition. FCRA legislation was initially introduced by
new Consumer Affairs & Coinage Chairman Kennedy (D-MA) in
February 1993. H.R. 1015, as introduced, was a substantial revision
of legislation considered in the previous Congress. In particular,
Representative Kennedy had removed both affiliate information
sharing and preemption provisions from the bill. Companion
legislation (S.783) was introduced in the Senate by Senator Bryan in
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April 1993 and hearings were held in the Senate Banking Committee
in May 1993.
The Senate Banking Committee initially marked up the bill
on October 28, 1993, and ordered reported legislation, which
included affiliate information sharing as well as preemption
provisions, by a vote of fifteen to four. Unlike the controversial
House bill of the previous Congress, the preemption provisions
added by the Senate Banking Committee focused on operational
concerns and were designed to occupy the field in these specific
areas. The previous House preemption amendment was broad and
applied only to state credit reporting laws. The 1993 Senate
preemption amendment focused specifically on occupying the field
related to several operational concerns of credit grantors, including
affiliate information sharing, and the language was far more precise
toward these areas.22 Unlike the 1992 House bill that focused simply
on state credit reporting laws, the 1993 Senate bill, as passed by the
Senate Banking Committee, expressly stated that "[n]o requirement
or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State ... with
respect to the exchange of information among persons affiliated by
common ownership or common corporate control. 23 Beginning with
the 1993 Senate Banking mark-up, this construction became the
standard form for affiliate information sharing preemption in all
subsequent FCRA legislative efforts.
Motivated by Senate Committee action, the House Consumer
Affairs & Coinage Subcommittee proceeded to mark-up its version
of the legislation on November 19, 1993. Unlike the Senate, House
consideration remained contentious, and Subcommittee amendments
to the Kennedy bill dealing with both affiliate information sharing
and preemption were withdrawn when faced with defeat.
The full House Banking Committee took up the bill on
February 9, 1994. At the full Committee mark-up, an amendment
offered by Representatives Dooley (D-CA), Baker (R-LA) and
McCollum (R-FL) authorizing affiliate information sharing was
passed by a thirty to nineteen vote. During the Committee mark-up

22. See S. REP. No. 103-209, at 7, 27 (1993).
23. 140 CONG. REc. at S4971 (daily ed. May 2, 1994).
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session, the sponsors indicated a broad based intent behind the

information sharing provisions.'
Subsequently, a preemption amendment modeled on the Senate
provision was adopted by voice vote. Importantly, Representative

Kennedy sought to offer an amendment to expressly exclude affiliate
information sharing from the preemption provisions. Opponents
remarked that the whole purpose of the Kennedy amendment was to

limit affiliate information sharing.2 '

The amendment met with

considerable opposition and the Committee rejected the amendment
on a voice vote. After considerable procedural rancor, the bill was

then reported from the Committee on a twenty-nine to twenty party
line vote on March 3, 1994.
The full Senate took up FCRA reform on May 4, 1994. With
limited discussion, the Senate passed a manager's amendment that
left the affiliate information sharing provisions intact, but sunset the

preemption provision after six years. The Senate then passed S.783
by an eighty-seven to ten bipartisan vote. The size and bipartisan

nature of the Senate vote effectively broke the logjam related to the
24. Representative Dooley, the primary sponsor, stated:
This amendment builds on the manager's amendment, which would
allow subsidiaries to share experience information with each other, as
well as information from a consumer's credit application, providing that
sharing is clearly and conspicuously disclosed to the consumer and the
consumer consents by signing and returning the application form to
establish their own credit bureaus and that if any information is shared
outside the affiliated entities, the entities would then be defined as a
credit reporting agency, subject to the provisions of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.
Mark-up of the Fair CreditReporting Act, Before the House Banking Comm., 103d Cong.
195-96 (Feb. 9, 1994); see also id. at 197-98 (statements of Representatives Baker and
McCollum).
Representative Bereuter (R-NE) in offering perfecting amendments to the
information sharing provisions stated:
The affiliate amendment is offered, it seems to me, largely because we
want not to treat the affiliate corporate organization differently than
from a bank that decides not to go to the affiliate structure. Now, any
bank that opts not to go to the affiliate structure can share information
freely from department to department under existing law. But if a bank
decides to adopt an affiliate kind of structure, a bank holding company,
then unless we adopt this legislation, we're saying that they cannot do
what a bank under a different corporate structure has the ability to do
and is doing today.
Id. at 208.
25. See Mark-up of the FairCredit Reporting Act Before the House Banking Comm.,
103d Cong. 231 (statements of Representatives Dooley and Baker).
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bill in the House. A compromise package set the preemption period
at eight years.2 6 The package revised the information sharing
provisions which provided that affiliated entities taking an "adverse
action" based on shared information were required to provide a
consumer with an Equal Credit Opportunity Act type of adverse
action notice and with an opportunity to request the nature of the
information shared. The House passed the compromise FCRA bill
on June 14, 1994 by a voice vote.27
Over the course of the summer of 1994, the respective House
and Senate Banking Committees were consumed with Interstate
Branching and Community Development legislation, as well as the
"Whitewater" hearings. Discussions to reconcile the relatively
minimal differences between the House and Senate bill did not occur
until September 1994. At that point, a global agreement was
reached, and the affiliate information sharing provisions were only
slightly modified from the House and Senate bills. The preemption
time period was set at eight years, but the text of the provision
remained unchanged as it applied to affiliate information sharing.
The House then passed this package twice by voice vote, on
September 27, 1994, and on October 5, 1994. However, due to
26. See Memorandum to Republican Members of the House Banking Committee from
the Minority Staff (June 9, 1994).
27. On the House floor, Representative Kennedy, the Subcommittee Chairman with
jurisdiction, described the package by stating:
This legislation does not only benefit consumers. It also benefits
credit bureaus and credit grantors. In the areas of prescreening and
information-sharing among affiliates, it extends new liberties to
industry.
Hopefully, those liberties will result in new credit
opportunities for consumers. The bill also carefully ensures that
grantors will not be the subject of frivolous lawsuits.
In addition, H.R. 1015 gives industry an 8-year federal
preemption of State laws. This compromise provision is the product of
a careful effort to balance industry's desire for nationwide uniformity
with States' vital interest in protecting their citizens. As many of my
colleagues are aware, this has been a contentious issue for quite some
time, and has impeded the progress of this bill in the past. I would have
preferred that there be no Federal preemption in this bill. Federal law
usually sets a floor, not a ceiling, for consumer protection-allowing
States to adopt added measures to protect their citizens. I see no reason
to depart from this precedent. Nevertheless, the 8-year preemption
mandated by this will test the viability of a uniform national standard.
If after 8 years the Federal law is not adequately protecting consumers,
then I would expect States to step in once again and do the job.
143 CoNG. REc. at H9810 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1997).
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isolated Senate opposition related to the civil liability provisions, the
bill died in the Senate.
3. Committee Reports
Senate Report 103-209 filed on December 9, 1993 contains
several items relating to affiliate information sharing and preemption.
Given the fact that the 1993 Senate Banking Committee bill formed
the underlying basis for the ultimate compromise legislation, this
Report should be given great weight in determining Congressional
intent.2"
The section-by-section analysis of the Senate bill provides the
clearest statement of the interaction of the preemption provision and
the affiliate information sharing section. 29 The preemption of "any

28. Concerning information sharing it states:
The Committee bill liberalizes the requirements that would otherwise
apply to entities related by common ownership or affiliated by common
corporate control in connection with consumer reports. Generally,
under current law, when information concerning a consumer is shared,
that information is deemed a 'consumer report' under the FCRA, and
the entity provided the information is considered a 'consumer reporting
agency', thereby triggering the requirements and consumer protections
under the FCRA. The Committee bill specifies certain circumstances
involving the sharing of information among affiliates where the
permissible purpose and other provisions of the FCRA are inapplicable.
See S. REP. No. 103-209, at 5 (1993).
29. The section-by-section analysis of the bill adds further:
Section 101 facilitates the sharing of information among entities related
by common ownership or affiliated by common corporate control by
excluding certain information from the definition of 'consumer report'.
This section excludes from the definition of 'consumer report'
the sharing of information concerning a consumer among related
entities if the information is comprised solely of transactions or
experiences between one of the entities and the consumer. The
exclusion covers any communication of such information among related
entities, whether the information is transferred directly between two
related entities or is communicated through a third related entity. The
committee does not intend to broaden the type of information that is
currently exempted from the definition of consumer report, but rather
intends to permit the sharing of that information among a broader range
of affiliated entities without triggering the conditions governing the
sharing of consumer reports under the FCRA.
Section 101 also excludes from the definition of 'consumer
report' information from a credit application that is shared among
affiliates, provided: (1) that it is clearly and conspicuously disclosed to
the consumer with the application that the information may be shared in
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state law" evidences a clear Congressional intent to federally occupy
the field." The operational concerns that Congress was seeking to
address could only be met by a single uniform federal standard
designed to supersede any conflicting state laws. The companion
House Report for the legislation was filed on April 28, 1994. The
House Report does not cover much new ground related to affiliate
information sharing or preemption."

this manner; and (2) that the consumer does not prohibit such sharing of
information in writing . . . .The Committee also intends that the
consumer's election to prohibit such sharing will not be a factor in the
consideration of the application.
Finally, the Committee bill provides that the definition of
'consumer report' does not include information from a consumer report
which is shared among related entities in connection with a credit or
insurance transaction not initiated by the consumer, if prior to the
sharing of the information, one of the affiliated entities clearly and
conspicuously disclosed to the consumer the fact that the information
might be shared with affiliates, and the consumer consents in writing to
the sharing of the information.
Id. at 8.
Related to the preemption provisions, the Senate Committee Report provides:
Recognizing the national scope of the consumer reporting industry and
the benefits of uniformity, the Committee bill includes provisions
preempting state law in several key areas of the FCRA. The bill
provides preemption for the sections involving sharing of information
among affiliates and prescreening.
Id. at 7.
30. Section 116 provides for the Federal preemption of any state law that relates to the
following provisions of the FCRA:
2. Affiliate sharing:
Section 116 preempts any state law related to the exchange of
information among persons affiliated by common ownership or
common corporate control. The Committee intends that this provision
will be applied to the modifications made by section 101 of the
Committee bill which amends section 603 of the FCRA pertaining to
exclusions from the definition of consumer report that permit, subject to
certain restrictions, the sharing of information among affiliates.
Id. at 27-28.
31. The most relevant passage states:
Section 624, as amended by section 120 of the bill, also preempts any
state law relating to... the exchange of information among persons
affiliated by common ownership or common corporate control. The
Committee intends that the provision regarding the exchange of
information among affiliates will be applied to the modifications made
[by] section 102(e) of the bill to section 603(d) and section 615(d)(4) of
the FCRA.
See H.R. REP. No. 103-486, at 55 (1994) (emphasis added).
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104th Congress (1995-1996)

Compared to prior Congresses, there was much less activity
related to FCRA reform during the 104th Congress. With the change
in political control of Congress, the FCRA legislation was a much
lower priority, particularly in the House. While bills were introduced
in the House, the House Banking Committee had no hearings or
mark-ups of legislation. In the Senate the compromise legislative
package from the 103d Congress was included as an amendment to a
Regulatory Relief bill in the Senate Banking Committee during late
1995. Ultimately, the regulatory relief package was included in the
massive Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act on the last day of
the Congress in October, 1996, with virtually no debate.
The only legislative history on the package from the 104th
Congress was the Senate Banking Report on the Regulatory Relief
bill, S. Rep. No. 104-185, filed on December 14, 1995. The Senate
Banking Report seems to fully capture Congressional intent behind
the legislation. 2 The bill was designed to create a uniform federal
32. The most relevant part of the Senate Report states:
(S)ection 624 preempts any state or local law with respect to the
exchange of information among affiliated person and preempts any
state or local law with respect to the form and content of any disclosures
required to be made under section 609(c). Finally, section 624
preempts any state or local law relating to section 623(b)(2), except that
such preemption does not apply to any state law in effect on the date of
enactment of this Act.
By preempting state and local provisions relating to the subject
matter regulated by these provisions of the FCRA, section 624
establishes the FCRA as the national uniform standardin these areas.
This section recognizes the fact that credit reporting and credit
grantingare, in many aspects, nationalin scope, and that a single set of
Federal rules promotes operational efficiency for industry, and
competitive prices for consumers. However, section 624 does not
supersede any settlement, agreement, or consent judgment between any
state attorney general and any consumer reporting agency in effect on
the date of enactment of this Act, and does not supersede any provision
of state law which is enacted after January 1, 2004, states explicitly that
the provision is intended to supplement this Act, and gives greater
protection to consumer than is provided under this Act.
See S. REP. No. 104-185 at 55 (1995) (emphasis added).
In addition, on the Senate floor, Senator Bond stated:
This bill also contains limited Federal preemption to ensure that there
are uniform Federal standards to govern a number of procedural issues
which are part of credit reporting and which will reduce the burdens on
the credit industry from having to comply with a variety of different
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standard to occupy the field in key operational areas such as
information sharing. This creation of a uniform federal standard was
done to bring operational efficiency for industry and competitive
prices for financial consumers.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS POST-ENACTMENT
In the time since the enactment of the FCRA reform
legislation, there have been certain developments related to state
statutes and regulations, one in Rhode Island and another in Florida,
that both deal with state insurance laws. The ultimate result of both
of these situations may help define the practical effect of the FCRA
preemption provisions.
First, the State of Rhode Island enacted the Financial
Institution Insurance Sales Act designed to regulate the insurance
activities of banks in the state after the Barnett decision. Section 10
of the Act expressly prohibits "financial institutions from using or
disclosing certain customer information for the purpose of selling or
soliciting insurance."33
The Rhode Island state statute was
immediately challenged by bank trade associations as being contrary
to 12 U.S.C. § 92 and the OCC was petitioned to preempt the law.
The OCC filed a request for comment dated December 16,
1997, in the Federal Register 4 and reopened the comment period on
March 11, 1997."
As part of the extended comment period, the
OCC asked the specific question: "[W]hat effect do recent
amendments to the FCRA have on the FIISA provision limiting the
ability of a bank to use its customer information to solicit and sell
insurance?" It is speculated that the OCC could preempt section 10
of the Rhode Island law, not on 12 U.S.C. § 92 or Barnett grounds,
but due to the FCRA's affiliate information sharing preemption
provisions under section 624. MasterCard and Visa filed a comment
State requirements. For example, the bill preempts requirements
regarding prescreening, information shared among affiliates,
reinvestigation time tables, obsolescence time periods and certain
disclosure forms.
141 CONG. REc. at S5449 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1995).
33. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-58-10 (Supp. 1997).
34. See Preemption Determinations, 62 Fed. Reg. 1950 (1997).
35. See id. at 12,883.
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letter arguing in favor of broad FCRA preemption and should the
Comptroller rule on these grounds, it will likely be challenged in
court, with the OCC accorded agency deference. Some speculate
that this would be a highly favorable test case for preemption
proponents. Unfortunately, the agency has delayed a final decision
on this matter at this time, and it remains a pending matter at the
Comptroller's Office.
Second, the Florida Department of Insurance, in response to
the Barnett decision, proposed bank insurance sales regulations.36
These regulations also contain provisions restricting information
exchanges between banks and their affiliates. As of January 1998,
the Florida regulations are still subject to a state administrative
process, but they will become final sometime during the 1998
calendar year. Given the stormy history of banks and the Florida
department of insurance, some currently speculate that the Florida
information sharing regulations could be the source of litigation
unless changed in the administrative process. In addition, some
currently speculate that a bank or bank trade association will likely
file suit to overturn these regulations should the information
restrictions remain, and that they will argue that § 624 of the FCRA
overrides the state insurance regulations.
V. THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS
INSURANCE INFORMATION & PRIVACY PROTECTION MODEL ACT

In October 1992, NAIC issued an Insurance Information and
Privacy Protection Model Act (Model Act) for the purpose of
"establish[ing] standards for the collection, use and disclosure of
information gathered in connection with insurance transactions by
insurance
institutions,
agents
or
insurance
support
organizations ... ."' Where states have adopted a Model Act, the
question arises whether such a state law or the FCRA would prevail.
In addition, the McCarran-Ferguson Act (McCarran) which provides,
generally, for the regulation of "the business of insurance" on the

36. See Fla. Admin. Weekly (Feb. 7, 1997).
37. Model Insurance and Information Privacy Protection Act § 670-1 (National
Association of Insurance Commissioners 1992).
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state level, must be considered.
Several states have passed the
39
Model Act. Therefore, if the Act's information sharing restrictions
are not preempted by the amended FCRA, particular problems will
develop for diversified companies with insurance operations that
operate over a multi-state area.
A.

NAIC ProvisionsRegardingAffiliate Information Sharing

The NAIC Model Act contains a series of restrictions on the
use of customer information by insurance institutions, agents or
insurance support organizations. Section 13 of the Model Act
establishes the general rule that an insurance institution "shall not
disclose any personal or privileged information about an individual
collected or received in connection with an insurance
transaction . . . ." The section then outlines eighteen exceptions.
One of these exceptions, subsection (L), permits limited affiliate
information sharing. While the general rule of the Model Act
prohibits all affiliate information sharing, subsection (L) provides an
exception. Subsection (L) permits disclosures "[t]o an affiliate
whose only use of the information will be in connection with an audit
of the insurance institution or agent or the marketing of an insurance
product or service, provided the affiliate agrees not to disclose for
any other purpose or to unaffiliated persons."
A question exists, then, whether section 624 of the federal
FCRA, as amended, preempts section 13, or would a company
defined as an insurance institution be limited under the Model Act to
affiliate information sharing only as permitted under subsection (L).
Section 624 of the FCRA provides that "[n]o requirement or
prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State ... with
respect to the exchange of information among persons affiliated by
common ownership or common corporate control .... " Section 13
appears to conflict with section 624 on its face. Section 13 is clearly
a State requirement concerning the exchange of information designed
to restrict information exchanges among affiliates. It appears that

38. See 15 U.S.C. §1012 (1994).
39. At this time the NAIC Model Act has been enacted in 17 states.
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section 13 fits clearly under section 624 of the FCRA and could be
preempted.
As previously discussed, the legislative history of the 1996
FCRA amendments appears to indicate a Congressional intent to
establish uniform national standards for affiliate information sharing.
Based on the ultimate statutory language, the legislative history in
both the House and Senate states a direct intent to preempt any state
law that may operationally impede affiliate information sharing.
Moreover, subsection (L)'s exception permits affiliate sharing
limited to "audits" or the "marketing of an insurance product or
service." During the 1994 House Banking consideration of FCRA
legislation, Representative Kennedy offered an amendment to the
bill's affiliate information sharing preemption provisions, seeking to
limit them to only "marketing" purposes. This amendment met with
strong opposition and was defeated on a voice vote. Based on this
failed Kennedy amendment, one can argue that Congress specifically
considered limited information sharing as proposed under the Model
Act and affirmatively decided to preempt it for purposes of a uniform
national standard.
It should be noted that section 624, as amended in 1996,
preempts laws enacted before January 1, 2004. This would include
states that have already adopted the Model Act. The Model Act
could restrict affiliate information sharing in any state that complies
with the requirements of new section 624(d)(2) of the FCRA. This
would require that: (1) the Model Act be enacted after January 1,
2004; (2) that the Model Act would have a new provision added
stating explicitly that the affiliate information sharing provisions
were intended to supplement the federal FCRA; and (3) the Model
Act's affiliate information sharing provisions give greater protection
to consumers than is provided under the federal FCRA. For states
that have already passed the Model Act, this would require reenactment after January 1, 2004, in accordance with section
624(d)(2).
B.

Conflict of Laws: FCRA and the McCarran-FergusonAct

As a general proposition, the business of insurance is
regulated by the states under McCarran. Based on this general rule,
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an argument may be constructed that if the business of insurance is
regulated by the states, then any state laws derived from the NAIC
Model Act should override the federal FCRA. Such a result would
again cause significant problems for diversified, multi-state financial
operations. Thus, it is appropriate to evaluate the status of the
amended FCRA vis-a-vis McCarran.
Based on an initial review of the statutes and relevant case
law, it appears that under McCarran, the NAIC Model Act passed by
a state would not override the federal FCRA. The NAIC Model Act
technically does not appear to qualify as a law "regulating the
business of insurance" for purposes of section 2(b) of McCarran.
Moreover, assuming that the NAIC Model Act would be considered
a law "regulating the business of insurance," the federal FCRA
would likely fall under the exception contained in section 2(b) of
McCarran that permits federal preemption by any federal law that
"specifically relates to the business of insurance. 40
For purposes of examining the inter-relationship between a
state law version of the NAIC Model Act and the Federal FCRA, the
key section of the statute is the first clause of section 2(b) as
underlined above. Courts have divided the clause into two sections,
with the first section being the general rule against Federal
preemption followed by the second section of the clause which
provides an exception to the rule.4

40. The relevant section of McCarran, section 2, provides:
(a) STATE REGULATION
The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or

taxation of such business.
(b) FEDERAL REGULATION
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance: Provided,That after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890,
as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15,
1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September
26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended,
shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by State law.
15 U.S.C. § 1012 (emphasis added).
41. See generally Paul B. Mengedoth, Annual Survey of the US. Supreme Court and
Federal Law: Casenote: Business of Insurance: National Banks, the "business of

104

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 2

Any statutory analysis under the first clause of section 2(b) is
divided into two parts. First, a determination must be made of
whether a state statute is a "law enacted by any State for the purpose
of regulating the business of insurance" and thereby prohibited from
being overridden by federal law under section 2(b)'s general rule.
Specifically, any state statute in question must deal with the core
business of insurance and not merely the business of insurance
companies.4 Second, a determination must then be made of whether
the federal law "specifically relates to the business of insurance" and
thereby becomes exempted from the general rule of section 2(b) for
purposes of federal preemption. "By its terms ... the [McCarran]
Act does not apply when the conflicting
federal statute 'specifically
' 43
insurance.'
of
relates to the business
1. State Laws Regulating the Business of Insurance
Under McCarran, the definition of "the business of
insurance" has been heavily litigated. The Supreme Court analysis
of this provision has evolved into a three part test to determine
whether a state statute involves "regulating the business of
insurance. 44 In determining what constitutes the "business of
insurance," the Court outlined the following three part test in the
leading case of Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno.45 The test
consists of the following three parts: "first, whether the practice has
the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second,
whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship
insurance," and an interpretive analysis of the McCarran-FergusonAct following Barnett
Bank ofMarion County v. Nelson, 30 CRIGHTON L. REv. 457 (Feb. 1997).
42. The Supreme Court stated:

The statute did not purport to make the States supreme in regulating all
activities of insurance companies; its language refers not to the persons
or companies who are subject to state regulation, but to laws 'regulating

the business of insurance.' Insurance companies may do many things
which are subject to paramount federal regulation; only when engaged
in the 'business of insurance' does the statute apply.
S.E.C. v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1969) (Black, J. dissenting and Harlan, J.

concurring in part, dissenting in part).
43. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
44. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982); see also United
States Dept of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993); Blue Shield of Texas v. Royal Drug,

440 U.S. 205 (1979).
45. 458 U.S. 119,129(1982).
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between the insurer and the insured; and third,whether the practice is
limited to entities within the insurance industry. 46 Further, in
evaluating whether a state law regulating a particular practice
involves the "business of insurance," the Pireno decision went on to
note that no single criteria stands alone and that they must be
evaluated in their entirety.
In applying the three part test to the NAIC model statute,
particularly relating to its affiliate information sharing limitations, it
appears that the NAIC Model Act largely fails to satisfy the Pireno
test. While the NAIC Model Act is intended to regulate the business
activities of insurance companies, it may fall short of "regulating the
business of insurance" for purposes of section 2(b) of McCarran
under the Court prescribed test. In order to satisfy the "business of
insurance" test, the Model Act must be evaluated under each branch
of the Pireno analysis. The first element of the Pireno test is a
determination of whether the Model Act has the effect of transferring
or spreading policyholder risk. This appears to be a difficult test to
satisfy. The NAIC Model Act is a privacy statute. For example, the
Act deals with privacy concerns, affiliate information sharing and
general handling of customer information. It bears no relation to
activities involved in the normal underwriting and related activities
of insurance companies intended to be covered by this part of the
Court's test. Thus, the Model Act clearly fails this element of the
"business of insurance" test as outlined under Pireno.
The second element of the Pirenotest is whether the practice
is integral to the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured. It would appear that consumer information and privacy
considerations could be a gray area under this branch of the Pireno
test. On one hand, information given by the insured to the insurer
could be considered an integral part of that relationship because that
information is the likely basis for underwriting decisions by the
insurer. How this information is handled would seem of some
importance to the relationship. Alternatively, one could argue that
the sharing of the information is less integral to the relationship and
is incidental or ancillary to the main policy relationship. In judging
the relationship between the insured and insurer, the Court has
46. Id.
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looked to whether a practice impacts upon "the type of policy which
could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement."47
While contrary arguments may be made, it appears that
affiliate information sharing as regulated by a state statute has little
or no impact on the issuance of any insurance policy, its terms,
reliability, interpretation or enforcement.
Therefore, affiliate
information sharing and its regulation would only fall, at best, as an
ancillary part of the insured/insurer relationship and would not be an
integral part of the relationship related to the core "business of
insurance" as determined by the courts. n8
Finally, the third element of the Pireno test is whether the
practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry. Under
this portion of the test, the NAIC Model Act appears to be inherently
flawed. An affiliate information sharing provision by its very nature
involves entities outside of the insurance industry. Diversified
financial companies controlling insurance companies generally have
non-insurance affiliates conducting a wide array of activities,
including activities such as credit card operations, mortgage banking
and real estate operations. These affiliates are not regulated as
insurance companies, nor would they generally be considered as part
of the insurance industry. Therefore, an insurance privacy statute,
such as the NAIC Model Act, that would have the general effect of
limiting the exchange of information between insurance and noninsurance affiliates, would per se fail the third element of the Pireno
test requiring that the activity be limited to entities within the
insurance industry.
In summary, the NAIC Model Act does not satisfy "business
of insurance" test under Pireno. While the state regulation of
insurance information may impact upon insurance companies, it does
not appear that the regulation of consumer information is related to
the core "business of insurance" as required under section 2(b) of
McCarran. Thus, the general rule against federal preemption should
not apply.

47. S.E.C. v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969).
48. See Union Labor Life Ins., 458 U.S. at 134 n.8.
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2. Federal Laws Specifically Related to the
Business of Insurance
Under section 2(b) of McCarran, the second half of the first
clause contains an exception to McCarran's general rule that state
laws prevail over conflicting federal laws. The exception provides
that a federal law which "specifically relates to the business of
insurance" may override a conflicting state law. Assuming arguendo,
that the NAIC Model Act would be a state law regulating the
business of insurance, then it appears that the FCRA would be a
federal law that "specifically relates to the business of insurance" and
thereby falls within section 2(b)'s exception.
In examining the FCRA, including the 1996 amendments, the
statute is filled with examples of express federal regulation of
consumer information related to insurance transactions. FCRA
sections 602, 603, 604, 605, 609, 615 and 624 all provide federal
regulation of consumer information related to insurance. 49 The
critical elements of the federal statutory scheme under the FCRA all
expressly cover insurance related information or practices, including
the affiliate information sharing provisions."
FCRA section 604(2)(C), describing the permissible purposes
to obtain a credit report, provides that such a report may be sent to a
person that "intends to use the information in connection with the
49. For example, section 602(b) describes the purposes of the FCRA and states:
(b) It is the purpose of this title to require that consumer reporting
agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of
commerce for consumer credit personnel, insurance, and other
information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer,
with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper
utilization of such information in accordance with the requirements of
this title 49.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1681b(3)(C) (West 1997) (emphasis added).
50. FCRA section 603(k)(1)(B)(I) describing "adverse actions," a key definition under
the Act, provides:
(1) ACTIONS INCLUDED.- The term 'adverse action'(13)
means-

(I) a denial or cancellation of, an increase in any charge for, or a
reduction or other adverse change in the terms of coverage or amount
of, any insurance, existing or applied for, in connection with the
underwritingof insurance ....
15 U.S.C. §1681a(k)(1) (emphasis added).
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underwriting of insurance."'" In addition, the statutory scheme for
prescreening, established as part of the 1996 amendments, is entirely
framed to cover firm offers of "credit or insurance. 5 2
Finally, the key definition of "consumer report" under section
603(d)(1) expressly includes as a federally regulated consumer
report, information to determine eligibility for "insurance to be used
as primarily for personal, family, or household purposes" as well as
insurance information described under section 604." The exception
from the definition of a federally regulated "consumer report" for
affiliate information sharing immediately follows under section
603(d)(2)(A). 4 The relevant sections of section 603(d) provide that
to the extent that the heart of the "consumer report" definition in
section 603(d)(1) covers information about insurance, the affiliate
information sharing exception in section 603(d)(2) must also apply to
insurance information.

51. Id. § 1681b(2)(C) (emphasis added).
52. Id. § 1681a(/).
53. Section 603(d) states:
(d) CONSUMER REPORT.-

(1) IN GENERAL. - The term 'consumer report' means any written,
oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer
reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit
standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used
or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in
establishing the consumer's eligibility for (A) credit or insuranceto be used primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes;
(13)
employment purposes; or
(C) any other purpose authorized under section 604.
54. The following exclusions are available:
(2)EXCLUSIONS. - The term 'consumer report' does not include (A) any -

(i)

report containing information solely as to transactions or

experiences between the consumer and the person making the report;
(ii) communication of that information among persons related by
common ownership or affiliated by corporate control; or
(iii) any communication of other information among persons related by
common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if it is clearly and

conspicuously disclosed to the consumer that the information may be
communicated among such persons and the consumer is given the

opportunity,

before the time that the information is initially

communicated, to direct that such information not be communicated
among such persons ....
Id. § 168la(d)(2) (emphasis added).
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As demonstrated by these key sections, the statutory scheme
under the FCRA directly regulates consumer information related to
insurance transactions. It would appear that through the express
inclusion of insurance in the statutory scheme Congress intended that
the federal FCRA would not be preempted by conflicting state laws.
The legislative history of the recently passed FCRA amendments is
also filled with references to the statute's federal regulation of
consumer information related to insurance. While these references
largely track and explain the statutory language, the Senate Report
from the 103d Congress indicates the Congressional intent to use the
FCRA to federally regulate insurance information.5
Finally, while the FCRA preemption provision under section
624(b)(2) dealing with affiliate information sharing does not
specifically use the word "insurance," Congress' intent was for
purposes of preemption to include the affiliate sharing exemption
from the base definition of "consumer report" under section
603(d)(1), which covers insurance information, so as to foster a
uniform national standard.
Based on the express terms of the FCRA, as amended in
1996, Congress clearly intended to federally regulate consumer
information related to the business of insurance under the FCRA.56
Assuming that the NAIC Model Act is considered a state law
"regulating the business of insurance," then the FCRA and its
preemption provisions are a federal law "specifically related to the
business of insurance." Thus, FCRA would fall under the exception
55. The Report states:
The consumer reporting agencies sell the information from their files to
their customers. Customers include retailers, insurance companies,
lenders, businesses that sell mailing lists, prospective employers, and
government agencies. Thus, a consumer report can be a decisive factor
in whether a consumer's application for credit, an apartment, a job, or
insurance will be accepted or rejected.
S. REP. No. 103-209, at 2 (1993).
56. Senate Report 103-209 states:
Section 116 [amending section 624] preempts any state law related to
the exchange of information among persons affiliated by common

ownership or common corporate control. The Committee intends that
this provision will be applied to the modifications ... of the Committee
bill which amend section 603 of the FCRA pertaining to exclusions
from the definition of consumer report that permit, subject to certain
restrictions, the sharing of information among affiliates.
S. REP. No. 103-209, at 27-28 (1993).
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contained in clause 1 of section 2(b) of McCarran and the preemption
outlined under section 624 of the Act should prevail over conflicting
state laws.
VI. UNIFORM PRIVACY PRINCIPLES
While information sharing should have profound consumer
benefits, concerns have been raised regarding protecting the
legitimate privacy interests of financial consumers. If an institution
is looking to establish a corporate-wide policy on privacy, one item
worth noting is the model privacy principles recently published by a
group of bank trade associations.
On September 18, 1997, the American Bankers Association,
the Bankers Roundtable, the Banking Industry Technology
Secretariat, the Consumer Bankers Association and the Independent
Bankers Association jointly issued a press release regarding the
creation of a "Uniform Set of Privacy Principles." 7 The "Privacy
Principles" relate to eight separate areas:
(1) Recognition of a customer's expectation of privacy.
Financial institutions should recognize and respect the privacy
expectations of their customers and explain principles of financial
privacy to their customers in an appropriate fashion.
(2) Use, collection and retention of customer information.
Financial institutions should collect, retain and use information about
individual customers only where the institution reasonably believes it
would be useful (and allowed by law) to administering that
organization's business and to provide products, services and other
opportunities to its customers.
(3) Maintenance of accurate information.
Financial
institutions should establish procedures so that a customer's
financial information is accurate, current and complete in
accordance with reasonable commercial standards.
Financial
institutions should also respond to requests to correct inaccurate
information in a timely manner.

57. Joint Statement of the American Bankers Association, the Bankers Roundtable, the
Banking Industry Technology Secretariat, the Consumer Bankers Association, and the
Independent Bankers Association (Sept. 18, 1997) (on file with the Bankers Roundtable).
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(4) Limiting employee access to information. Financial
institutions should limit employee access to personally identifiable
information to those with a business reason for knowing such
information and educate those employees with such access regarding
the importance of confidentiality and customer privacy.
(5) Protection of information via established security
procedures.
(6) Restrictions on the disclosure of account information.
Financial institutions should not reveal specific information about
customer accounts or other personally identifiable data to unaffiliated
third parties for their independent use, except for exchanging
information with reputable information reporting agencies the
accuracy of such information, or in the performance of bona fide
corporate due diligence, unless a) the information is provided to help
complete a customer initiated transaction, b) The customer requests
it, c) the disclosure is required by/or allowed by law or d) the
customer has been informed about the possibility of disclosure for
marketing or similar purposes through a prior communication and is
given the opportunity to decline (opt out).
(7) Maintaining customer privacy in business relationships
with thirdparties. If personally identifiable customer information is
provided to a third party, the financial institutions should insist that
the third party adhere to similar privacy principles that provide for
keeping such information confidential.
(8) Disclosure of privacy principles to customers. Financial
institutions should devise methods of providing a customer with an
understanding of their privacy policies. In addition, each financial
institution should make its privacy policy available to customers.
The "Uniform Set of Privacy Principles" also provide an
implementation plan for financial institutions which includes: (1)
approving the plan at the level of the Board of Directors or the Office
of the Chair of the bank; (2) communicating bank policies related to
customer privacy will be communicated to bank customers; (3)
informing and educating employees about the bank's plan to
implement the privacy principles; (4) banks will obtain agreements
from third party vendors on a case-by-case basis to comply with the
bank's privacy principles; (5)'notifying customers of their right to
opt-out from the bank providing customer information to those third
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parties where a bank provides information to unrelated and
unaffiliated third parties for their independent use for marketing or
similar purposes; and (6) establishing and maintaining procedures by
which customers can correct inaccurate customer information.
The American Bankers Association, the Bankers Roundtable,
the Banking Industry Technology Secretariat, the Consumer Bankers
Association and the Independent Bankers Association strongly urged
its membership to adopt these "Privacy Principles."
VII. CONCLUSION

The amendments made to the FCRA in 1996 and
implemented in October 1997 will have a major impact on the
consumer credit market. Relieving the uncertainty concerning the
sharing of information between affiliates and preempting any state
laws will permit companies to offer their customers financial services
in a more efficient and beneficial manner. Congress intended to
create a uniform national standard for affiliate information sharing
and intended to preempt contrary state laws. Moreover, Congress
believed that this result would lead to operational efficiency, better
customer service and more competitive prices for consumers. The
amendments made to the FCRA are a key step in fully utilizing
today's technology to benefit financial consumers.

